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In the 1990 issue of Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice Dr. Werner Menski, expert 
on South Asian laws at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, wrote an article 
outlining the need for immigration advisers to be informed about South Asian legal 
systems (Menski 1990). In so doing he highlighted the relative lack of knowledge about 
these systems among practitioners and ways in which this could be overcome, by 
consulting existing writing and through education programmes. More than ten years on 
we might find that Menski’s observations about the lack of knowledge of South Asian 
laws would not be significantly different. In the same period we have seen the rapid 
expansion of immigration and asylum as areas of legal practice, a fact that makes the 
knowledge-gap even more yawning.  
One key method by which one can input information concerning South Asian 
laws, and other legal systems for that matter, into the legal process is through the 
submission of expert reports. My own experience of teaching and research in 
Comparative Immigration and Nationality Law and Ethnic Minorities and Law, has led 
me to become ever more aware of the need for study and dissemination of information 
about Asian and African legal systems in the European context (Shah 2003a). I have 
been called upon by practitioners to write reports particularly on South Asian laws, but 
also on nationality and immigration laws elsewhere. I use this opportunity therefore to 




Interaction with legal advisers 
 
How does one identify whether an expert report is required in any particular case? 
Werner Menski already highlighted the fact that at the time of writing a number of 
existing books by both UK-based and South Asian writers could be consulted, but 
warned that they might be too technical, not contain the sort of information required, or 
may simply mislead the reader. More texts that usefully fill existing gaps in the literature 
have appeared since that time, particularly on the family law dimension (see Pearl and 
Menski 1998, Monsoor 1999, Menski 2001, Menski 2003). While these may not be 
conclusive or may not furnish the reader with the precise points that are required, they 
might certainly provide the practitioner a better starting point from which to address the 
expert.  
Experienced lawyers will often have developed an instinct about the need for 
better information about a disputed point of fact or law and will tend to take the 
initiative to contact an expert. The ILPA Directory of experts (1997) is a useful database of 
information about country experts in a wide number of fields. There is now a pool of 
expertise, organised under the auspices of the Centre for Applied South Asian Studies 
(www.casas.org.uk), which seeks to provide an interface between academia and the 
practice world, and in areas that are not restricted to law. With the growth of South 
Asian communities in Britain this sort of knowledge base is likely to assume a far greater 
importance than is currently realised.  
Jim Gillespie (2001) has recently written about the role of experts in the asylum 
context, highlighting the need to provide clear instructions as to what is needed from an 
expert. However, some legal advisers will often not be sure about what they really require 
or what sort of expert should be consulted on a particular matter. In my experience key 
points might surface only after discussion with legal advisers, and this might indicate the 
importance of making contact as early as possible. Often an expert might be able to 
clarify whether a particular line of argument may or may not be worth running, even 
before a report is commissioned. Ideally, one would almost always prefer to be in contact 
with the client her/himself so as to pick out things that the legal adviser might not have 
thought to be of importance.  
The fact that I have specialised in immigration/refugee law is, I find, an 
advantage. This is particularly so because of the level of communication that can be 
struck almost immediately since the legal adviser does not have to explain complicated 
bits of immigration law before introducing the main issue. On the other hand, one also 
often finds that advisers are not trained in public or private international law, or the finer 
points of international refugee law, and one can have some useful input at that level also. 
I am sometimes concerned that there is a tendency to rely on experts for the most basic 
information, although this is partly understandable given the time pressures on 
practitioners.  
One example shows, however, that badly thought out lines of argument are not 
always due to the problem of time. An adviser whose client was born in India, had been 
trained as a militia in Pakistan, and was due to be removed to Pakistan recently contacted 
me. She was adamant that as her client was born in Indian Kashmir, he was therefore a 
Kashmiri national (as indeed the client insisted), a point that could be used to resist 
removal to Pakistan. She had not considered that, as he was born in what is Indian 
territory, he might be an Indian national and removed there even if the removal to 
Pakistan was successfully contested! This indicates a lack of knowledge about basic 
principles of international law relating to the acquisition of nationality and its 




 ‘Legal’ or ‘non-legal’ information? 
 
I have often had to say that I cannot prepare reports on political situations on any 
particular country. I would not advise, for example, on the accessibility of Indian territory 
to Taliban-linked militia groups in the assessment of possible risk to a client. Neither 
would I say that I advise only on strictly ‘legal’ situations. In the South Asian context the 
line between ‘law’ and ‘society’ is never as clearly demarcated, as one tends to assume is 
the case for western legal systems. However, this is the stage at which our preconceived 
notions about South Asian law - that it is but an offshoot of the common law system, or 
that statutory laws necessarily provide accurate guidance on law ‘on the ground’ as it 
were - interfere with a proper assessment of any legal issue or principle. Many experts 
and High Commission/Embassy personnel unfortunately restrict themselves to such 
assessments. However, disregarding what one might call the ‘socio-legal’ dimension, that 
is crucial to an understanding of Muslim and Hindu law issues, can lead to giving unduly 
narrow, even inaccurate and false impressions.  
I find it nearly always necessary to take into account and to draw attention to 
how the socio-cultural issues interact with the ‘legal’ issues at stake. Thus, in one case, I 
thought it crucial to explain by reference to Gujarati socio-cultural norms why a young, 
orphaned woman who had been raped, and was now applying for leave on 
compassionate grounds, could not be expected to have recourse to the official criminal 
law system given attitudes to the public airing of such matters, as well as the potential for 
further victimisation had she done so. I also had to anticipate the possibility that the 
Home Office might point out that she could have resorted to her brothers’ ‘protection’ 
by attempting to draw a sort of psychological profile of her brothers from the 
information given, and thereby to argue that her brothers were not capable of or willing 
to protect their sister’s interests. Similarly, in a Tamil case it had to be explained why a 
son would be thought to be the more appropriate carer for elderly parents than married 
daughters who were residing in Sri Lanka. In inter-family adoptions it may be necessary 
to highlight the importance of male heirs who would be expected to perform essential 
sacraments upon the parents’ death. The examples are many and varied.  
Thus while the border between the ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ is often not an easy one 
to draw, it will be important to bring out the wider issues is such cases, particularly as a 
way of explaining how socio-cultural presuppositions inform the behaviour of the parties 
involved. This might come dangerously close to assessing the credibility of clients and, in 
recent cases, the benches have tended to warn that experts ought not to give their 
opinion as to credibility. Thus, in R v IAT ex parte Ez-Eldin [2001] Imm AR 98 Blofeld J 
noted:  
 
“I doubt if an expert’s opinion of an applicant’s credibility is, in itself, admissible. 
Credibility is essentially a matter solely for the court or Tribunal that hears the 
case.”  
 
One must therefore remain careful not to pronounce too strongly about such matters, 
while pointing to relevant factors as objectively as possible. In practice, this may not be 
so easy or smooth. As in Ez-Eldin, the expert might have relied on certain facts as given 
by the client which are subsequently found not to be credible, thereby compromising 
part or whole of the expert opinion. 
 
 
Overcoming dominant legal approaches  
 
Legal processes in the UK always carry certain cultural presuppositions that distort South 
Asian legal principles and prevent a clear view of their correct applicability in factual 
situations. This is a problem that infects the whole legal system - from the training of 
practitioners and case preparation, right through to judicial decision (see, for example, 
Shah 2002). The key reason here is the imposition of dominant western positivist 
approaches to South Asian legal matters, and therefore the expectation that South Asian 
legal patterns should mirror the western model. If they do not, which they almost always 
do not, then the accusation all too easily levelled is that these systems are failing to 
protect the people concerned sufficiently or are breaching human rights principles. It is 
ironic that officials level such accusations while they are, at the same time, attempting to 
deny human rights to the persons concerned! Spijkerboer (2000) has instructively argued 
that such differences between North and South are distorting assessments of the 
situation of refugee women.  
 The UK legal system tends to hold negative attitudes to Asian and African laws, 
regularly delegitimising legal acts following South Asian patterns. A Professor of 
Comparative Law recently pointed out to me that there has generally been a difference in 
the way that the Home Office and Foreign Office (and formerly the Colonial Office) 
have tended to treat matters of Asian and African laws. During the colonial period 
recognition was given to such laws abroad, while the Home Office retained the attitude 
that English law should prevail. It seems that negative, eurocentric attitudes, nowadays 
being driven by immigration control concerns, are becoming more entrenched the 
further we move away from the colonial period.  
The adviser or the expert therefore has the added burden of overcoming such 
prejudiced and legally sanctioned forms of discrimination, before decision makers and 
judges can be informed, at the risk of being accused of ‘dodginess’ oneself (Menski 
2002)!  Thus Pearl and Menski (1998: 171) provide the illustration of marriage under 
Muslim law:   
 
“In quite a few cases, absence of witnesses or more generally of documentation 
of a Muslim marriage entered into in South Asia has been an issue for 
determination before the British courts and tribunals. While the South Asian 
courts … lean in favour of recognising such marriages as valid, European judges 
appear to need constant reminders of the existence of a strong presumption in 
favour of marriage in Muslim law.”  
  
But official intransigence has been taken a step further in the immigration sphere. 
Immigration laws are creating their own sphere of non-recognition, particularly as regards 
South Asian laws, and in defiance of conflicts of law principles. No area is immune from 
attack here: marriages (Sachdeva 1993, Menski 2001: 10-12, Macdonald and Webber 
2001: 418-424, 426-431, Shah 2003b), divorces (Pearl and Menski 1998: 382-396, Mayss 
2000, Macdonald and Webber 2001: 424-426) and adoptions (Mortimore 1994, 
Macdonald and Webber 2001: 455, McKee 2002: 35-36) are just some of the prominent 
examples. I recently wrote a report concerning an inter-family Sikh adoption in India 
where the Home Office lawyers were alleging that this system of adoptions as recognised 
under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 was violative of human rights! 
Considering the in-built discrimination against such adoptions in the Rules, this was 
adding a further barrier to objective assessment of the issues.  
 Once reports are submitted, the important question is how they are received. It is 
understandable, as Jim Gillespie (2001) pointed out, that courts and tribunals have 
become concerned about experts who tend to be partial, often pushing their own 
political agendas in asylum cases. Yet there is another dimension that needs to be 
discussed more openly. There is an palpable perception among the experts on South 
Asian issues that decision makers are increasingly dismissive of expert reports, thereby 
calling into question the willingness of tribunals and courts to overcome the sorts of 
entrenched attitudes highlighted above.  
One cannot help getting the feeling that in the immigration system, decision 
makers are driven by control considerations at the expense of just treatment of cases. I 
was recently told that a marriage registrar in Scotland refused to accept my report to the 
effect that an extra-judicial divorce had been effected, thus undermining an Indian 
woman’s claim to remain in the UK with her second husband. The contention of divorce 
was rejected, not on grounds of any faults in the legal arguments, but because I had used 
words like “seems to have been”. So an attempt to be careful not to usurp the function 
of officials by making categorical findings was turned around as a device to reject the 
validity of a legal act on the flimsiest grounds. In a recent case involving a Hindu man 
from Bangladesh, a report by Werner Menski was dismissed summarily despite the 
provision of details of the systematic failure of the Bangladeshi authorities to protect 
Hindu property owners (Appeal no. HX/25277/2002). Although this area needs to be 
researched in more detail, it does seem that the long-observed ‘culture of disbelief’ within 





While expert reports are written primarily to have an impact within legal proceedings 
they may serve other, rather more inchoate, but nonetheless important ends. As an 
academic it is valuable for me to get to write reports as way of creating a dialectical 
relationship between the theory we learn and teach and the ‘real world’ of actual cases. In 
this way, we too learn about what sorts of problems are being thrown up at the practice 
end, and how existing knowledge can be adapted to respond to them. I have found such 
reports very useful in teaching students about the ways in which what they are learning 
can be used constructively, and as illustrations that South Asian law remains of vital 
importance in practice despite the impressions that ‘mainstream’ legal education and 
literature provide.  
It remains an unfortunate fact that, beyond their use value in the case at hand, 
reports that are written after expending considerable research efforts generally do not see 
the light of day. In my view good reports can constitute an important information 
resource and one is aware of several ideas to publish such reports as alternative law 
reports. That would be an important development in this field, which will contribute to 
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